We analyze the "F-locality condition", which was taken by Kay to be a mathematical implementation of the philosophical bias (we call it the "Locality principle") that in a sufficiently small region of an arbitrary spacetime the laws must coincide with that usual in the Minkowski space. In a succession of papers the F-locality condition was used to build a generalization of semiclassical gravity to non-globally hyperbolic spacetimes. In particular, a theorem was proved by Kay, Radzikowski and Wald showing that existence of a time machine with a compactly generated Cauchy horizon is inconsistent with the F-locality condition. We argue that this result is against the F-locality condition rather than against the time machine. We also show that this condition imposes a sever restriction on the geometry of the world (it is just this restriction that comes into conflict with the existence of a time machine), which does not follow from the abovementioned philosophical bias. So, the F-locality condition can be abandoned or modified without sacrificing the Locality principle. As an example we consider a particular modification, the "MF-locality condition". The theory obtained by replacing the F-locality condition with the MF-locality condition possesses a few attractive features. One of them is that it is consistent with both the Locality principle and existence of time machines.
Introduction
Recent years much progress has been achieved toward development of a rigorous and meaningful quantum field theory in curved background (semiclassical gravity). In particular, in the framework of the "algebraic approach to quantum field theory" (see [1] and references there) for globally hyperbolic spacetimes a complete and self-consistent description was constructed of the real scalar field obeying the Klein-Gordon equation
Global hyperbolicity plays a crucial role in this theory, which therefore cannot be straightforwardly extended to the general case (in particular, to spacetimes with causality violations (time machines)). However though a general theory is not constructed so far, a few "reasonable candidates for minimal necessary conditions" [1] were considered, that is "statements which begin with the phrase 'Whatever else a quantum field theory (on a given non-globally hyperbolic spacetime) consists of, it should at least involve . . .' " [1] . The best-studied candidate necessary condition is the "F-locality condition" proposed by Kay [2] . Its importance is in that it turns out to be quite restrictive. In particular, a theorem was recently proved by Kay, Radzikowski and Wald (the KRW-theorem in the sequel), which says roughly speaking that the F-locality condition cannot hold in a spacetime containing a time machine with the compactly generated Cauchy horizon [1] . In the paper [1] and in a number of succeeding papers this theorem was interpreted as giving support to Hawking's "Chronology Protection Conjecture" [3] . There is a troublesome aspect in such interpretation, however, lying in the fact that One cannot just forbid time machines! It is about six years now that a mechanism which could "protect causality" [3] against time machines is actively looked for. The driving force for this search is apparently the idea that existence of a time machine would defy the usual notion of free will. And this would be the case, indeed, if we found a paradox (like that usually called "the grandfather paradox"). For, suppose we found such a system and such its initial (that is fixed to the past of the time machine creation) state that the equations governing its evolution have no solution due to the nontrivial causal structure of the spacetime. We know that a system prepared in this state must evolve according just to those equations (to change them we must have confessed that we overlooked some effects, which would have implied that we simply built an improper model, but not found a paradox) and at the same time we know that they have no solution. So we have to conclude that such an initial state somehow cannot be realized, that is "[. . . ]if there are closed timelike lines to the future of a given spacelike hypersurface, the set of possible initial data for classical matter on that hypersurface[. . . ]" is "[. . . ]heavily constrained compared with the same local interactions were embedded in a chronologyrespecting spacetime" [4] . The dislike for such a contradiction with "a simple notion of free will" [5] was so strong that Rama and Sen in [6] , Visser in [7] , and in fact Hawking and Ellis in [5] proposed just to postulate the impossibility of time machines. Also a postulate prohibiting time machines is implicitly contained (as is shown by the KRW theorem) in Kay's "F-locality condition" (from now on by a "time machine" we mean exclusively a time machine with the compactly generated Cauchy horizon). The irony of the situation is that, while no paradoxes are found so far [8] , such postulates in the absence of a mechanism which could enforce them lead to precisely the same constraints on one's will. Indeed, we know that there are initial conditions on the metric and the fields such that, when they are fixed at a spacelike surface 1 , the Einstein equations coupled with the equations of motion for these fields lead to formation of a time machine. So, if a postulate forbids time machines we only can conclude either that (1) there are some (e. g. quantum) effects which we have overlooked and which being taken into consideration always change the equations of motion so that the time machine does not form, or that (2) such initial conditions are somehow forbidden. Both possibilities were considered in the literature.
(1). A popular idea was that the vacuum polarization near a would-be Cauchy horizon (when it is compactly generated) becomes so strong that its backreaction on the metric prevents the formation of the horizon. This idea, however, has never been embodied in specific results. The vacuum polarization in spacetimes with time machines was evaluated for a few simplest cases [3, 9, 10] 2 and it turned out that sometimes it diverges on the Cauchy horizon and sometimes it does not (in the perfect analogy with, say, the Minkowski space). So, at least at present, this effect is unusable as a mechanism protecting causality. (2) . It is possible that initial data leading to formation of a time machine are forbidden not by a restriction on our will, but simply by the fact that they require some unrealizable conditions. It was shown [3] , for example, that to create a time machine of a non-cosmological nature (that is evolving from a non-compact Cauchy surface) one has to violate the Weak energy condition and a number of restrictions was found on such violations (see e. g. [11] ). None of them, however, has been able to rule time machines out. Moreover, recently a classical scenario for WEC violations was proposed [12] .
Thus at present any postulate prohibiting time machines without adducing a mechanism which enforces this prohibition raises the alternative of rejecting either the postulate or the idea that whether one can perform an experiment does not depend on whether causality still holds somewhere in the future.
In the case of the F-locality condition the alternatives at first glance seem equally unattractive since this condition is based on the Locality principle (see Section 3). However closer inspection shows that the F-locality condition does contain a strong arbitrary requirement (in Section 4 we discuss this fundamental point in great detail). So, one can reconcile the Locality principle with quantum field theory in spacetimes with time machines by just abandoning this requirement. In doing so one still can use the Locality principle in the theory. It is only necessary to find its another mathematical implementation. As an example we consider in Section 5 the "MF-locality condition". An important point is that while expressing the Locality principle (and seemingly doing it more adequately than the F-locality condition), it does not forbid time machines.
Geometrical preliminaries
An important role in our discussion will be played by the notion of global hyperbolicity. Globally hyperbolic (GH) spacetimes most adequately meet the concept of a "good" or "usual" spacetime (the Minkowski spacetime, for example, is GH). Whether or not a neighbourhood N ⊂ M is GH is not determined exclusively by its geometry. Due to the requirement that J + (p) ∩ J − (q) ⊂ N it may happen that N is not GH even though (N, g N ) is GH when it is regarded as a spacetime in its own right. So, to describe the geometrical properties of a neighbourhood proper we introduce a new notion 3 :
Definition 2. We call a subset N of a spacetime (M, g) intrinsically globally hyperbolic if (N, g N ) is a globally hyperbolic (GH) spacetime.
Clearly, whether a neighbourhood N is an IGHN does not depend on the geometry of M − N (in contrast to whether it is a GHN).
To avoid confusion, note that our notion of "global hyperbolicity" is that of [5] and differs from that in [1, 2] . The latter corresponds to our "intrinsic global hyperbolicity". For later use let us list a few obvious properties of (intrinsically) globally hyperbolic neighbourhoods [(I)GHN's]: (2) An intersection of two (I)GHN's is an (I)GHN,
Any GHN is an IGHN and an IGHN is a GHN iff it is causally convex (that is iff no causal curve leaving the IGHN returns in it), Thus, intrinsic global hyperbolicity is a weaker condition than global hyperbolicity. In particular,
For any point P ∈ M and any its neighbourhood V there exists an IGHN N : P ∈ N ⊂ V , while such a GHN exists if and only if strong causality holds in P .
Property (3) enables us to construct a simple and useful example of a connected IGH but not GH subset of the (3-dimensional) Minkowski space 4 .
Example (A "bad" set). Let V be the cube {x k ∈ (−4, 4)}. Consider the strip S ⊂ V (see Fig. 1 ) given by the system
where ρ, ϕ are the polar coordinates on the plane x 1 , x 2 . There are causally connected points on S and, in particular, there are points connected by null geodesics lying in V (or null related in V , in terms of [1, 2] ). A simple calculation based on the fact that A is spacelike whenever |A 0 /A i | < 1 (6) 
So, a causal curve can connect two points in S only if one of them lies above the plane Φ ≡ {v| x 0 (v) = 0} and the other, below Φ. Hence, (a) All causal curves connecting points of S intersect the plane Φ.
Similarly, by simple though tiresome considerations one can show that (b) There is a closed set Θ ⊂ Φ such that S ∩ Θ = ∅ and none of the causal curves from S to S intersects Ψ ≡ Φ − Θ.
(E. g. we can choose Ψ ≡ {v ∈ Φ| ρ(v) ∈ (0.8, 2.2), |ϕ(v)| < 0.1}.) Consider now S as a subset of the spacetime M ′ ≡ M − Θ. Properties (a,b) ensure that S is a (closed) achronal set and hence by Prop. 6.6.3 of [5] the interior B of its Cauchy domain in M ′ is a GH subset of M ′ . Thus by (3) B is an IGHN and not a GHN.
Note that we have used the fact that M is the Minkowski space only in stating (6) . It can be easily seen, however, that within any neighbourhood in any spacetime coordinates x i can be found such that (6) holds in the cube {x k ∈ (−4, 4)}. So, (being generalized to the 4-dimensional case) this example proves the following proposition: Proposition 1. For any point p and any its neighbourhood V such a connected IGHN B ⊂ V of p and such a pair of null related in V points r, q ∈ B exist that r and q are not connected by any causal curve lying in B.
F-locality
The algebraic approach to quantum field theory (below we cite only some basic points which have to do with F-locality, for details see [1] and references there) is based on the notion of the "field algebra", which is a * -algebra with identity I generated by polynomials in "smeared fields" φ(f ), where f ranges over the space D(M ) of smooth real valued functions compactly supported on M . The "smeared fields" φ(f ) are just some abstract objects (informally they can be understood as
, where φ(x) is the "field at a point" operator of the (non-rigorous) conventional QFT). A field algebra is defined by the relations (for all f, h ∈ D(M ) and for all pairs of real numbers a, b):
(defining a "pre-field algebra") and a relation fixing commutators [φ(f ), φ(h)], which we discuss in the following subsections.
Given a field algebra one can proceed to build a complete quantum theory of the free scalar field by introducing the notion of states, postulating some properties for "physically realistic" states and prescriptions for evaluating physical quantities (such as the renormalized expectation value of the stress-energy tensor) for these states. We will not go into this "second level" [2] of the theory. 
The globally hyperbolic case
Then we call a bidistributional solution of the homogeneous Klein-Gordon equation △ U ≡ △ A U − △ R U the advanced minus retarded solution on U . It turns out that for any IGHN U , △ U exists and is unique. So we complete the definition of a "field algebra" by adding to (7) the following commutator relation:
Which of the bidistributional solutions of equation (1) is the advanced minus retarded solution for a given region U is completely determined by the causal structure of U . This allows one to prove the following important fact [2] :
The F-locality property (Form I). Every point p in a GH spacetime M has an intrinsically globally hyperbolic neighbourhood U p such that, for all f, h ∈ D(U p ), relation (8) holds with △ M replaced by △ Up .
We can also reformulate the F-locality property in a slightly different form by "gluing" all these △ Up into a single bidistribution △.
Let △ be a bidistribution on
Definition 5. We shall call U and △ matching if U is a connected IGHN and
The F-locality property (Form II). There are such an open covering of a GH spacetime M by IGHN's {U α } and such a bidistribution △ on E U that (9) △ matches any U α (10) When (f, h) ∈ E U , relation (8) holds with △ M replaced by △.
Here and subsequently if {U α } is a set of neighbourhoods in M we write E U for
The non-globally hyperbolic case
To build a field algebra in a non-globally hyperbolic spacetime we can start with a "pre-field algebra" (7). Then, however, we meet a problem with the commutator relation, since △ M is (uniquely) defined only for GH spacetimes and there are no obviously preferred solutions of (1) any more. So, we need some new postulate and Kay proposed [2] to infer such a postulate from the equivalence principle, which as applied to our situation he formulated as follows.
The Locality principle. On an arbitrary spacetime, the laws in the small should coincide with the "usual laws for quantum field theory on globally hyperbolic spacetimes".
From this principle he postulated in a sufficiently small neighbourhood of a point in a non-globally hyperbolic spacetime what holds by itself in a GH spacetime. Namely, he requires:
The F-locality condition (Form I). Every point p in M should have an intrinsically globally hyperbolic neighbourhood U p such that, for all f, h ∈ D(U p ), relation (8) holds with △ M replaced by △ Up .
It is meant that a spacetime for which there is no field algebra satisfying this condition (a "non-F-quantum compatible" spacetime) cannot arise as an approximate description of a state of quantum gravity and must thus be considered as unphysical.
To reveal the logical structure of the F-locality condition we reformulate it analogously to the F-locality property. An important difference between these two parts of the F-locality condition is that (12) just specifies what algebra we take to be the "field algebra", while (11) is a nontrivial requirement placed from the outset upon the spacetime. It is significant that the proof of the KRW-theorem rests upon (11) .
The F-locality condition clearly does not fix all commutators. The value of [φ(f ), φ(h)] remains still undefined for f, h whose supports do not belong to a common U α . Moreover, the uncertainty extends to arbitrarily small regions. When we want to find such local quantities as T µν (p) or, say, φ 2 (p) it would be enough for us to know all commutators [φ(f ), φ(h)] with functions f, h both supported in a small neighbourhood V of p. This leads us to the following question: Is it true for at least some open covering {V α } that
whenever both △ F and △ ′F satisfy (11) (with possibly different {U α })? It turns out that the answer is negative even in the simplest case. Indeed, if M is the Minkowski space and △ F is a solution of (1) satisfying (11), then so is △ ′F :
and where by a µ we denote an arbitrary constant spacelike vector field. Clearly for any {V α } we can find such a µ that (13) breaks down. So the F-locality condition was proposed only as a necessary condition which is to be supplemented with conditions of "the second level" to obtain a complete theory.
The paradox and its resolution
The F-locality condition (or (11) to be more specific) includes actually a postulate forbidding time machines. This follows from the Kay-Radzikowski-Wald theorem:
The KRW theorem. If a spacetime has a time machine with the compactly generated Cauchy horizon, then there is no extension to M of the usual field algebra on the initial globally hyperbolic region D which satisfies the F-locality condition.
Here by "the usual field algebra" an algebra is meant where for f, h ∈ D(D) relation (8) As is discussed in the Introduction postulating causality without adducing a "protecting" mechanism one comes up against a contradiction with the usual notion of free will, which can be regarded as a paradox.
Such a situation (when a paradox arises from postulating in the general case a condition harmless in the GH case) is in no way strange or new.
Example (Classical pointlike particles). Consider a system of elastic classical balls. As long as one studies only GH spacetimes one sees that the following property holds Going to arbitrary spacetimes one finds that evolution of a system of balls is not uniquely fixed any more by what fixes it in the GH case. To overcome this problem (in the perfect analogy with the F-locality condition) one could adopt the following postulate 6 (note that in the general case it is just a postulate, that is an extraneous (global) condition and not a consequence of any other local principles accepted in the model):
"The condition of balls conservation". Any partial Cauchy surface should intersect the same number of the world lines of the balls.
Then one would find [6, 8] that there are "non-classical compatible" spacetimes (e. g. the Deutch-Politzer space) that is spacetimes in which initial data (i. e. data at some partial Cauchy surface) exist incompatible with the "Postulate of balls conservation". This fact constitutes an (apparent, see [8] ) paradox and so, one could claim that the existence of such paradoxes suggests that time machines are prohibited [6] . On the other hand, as we discussed above it seems more reasonable to look for contradictions which we ourselves could introduce in the model in process of constructing. In doing so we would interpret the "non-classical compatibility" of the Deutch-Politzer spacetime as an evidence not against the realizability of this spacetime, but rather against the postulate. Indeed, abandoning this postulate we resolve the paradox (and thus permit time machines) while causing no harm to any known physics [8] .
The above example suggests that to avoid the difficulties connected with forbidding the time machine, which we discussed in the Introduction, it would be natural just to abandon the F-locality condition. The problem, however, is that while we can easily abandon "the postulate of balls conservation", the F-locality condition seems to be based on the philosophical bias resembling the equivalence principle, which is something one would not like to reject. So, in the remainder of the Section we show that the F-locality condition contains actually an arbitrary (i. e. not implied by the Locality principle, or any other respectable physical principle) global requirement and therefore can be rejected or modified without regret.
Proposition 2. For any △ and any neighbourhood V there exists a connected IGHN B ⊂ V that does not match △.
Proof. Without loss of generality (see (4) ) V may be thought as being an IGHN. So, either V itself is the desired neighbourhood, or △ V is the advanced minus retarded solution △ V on V . In the latter case we can simply adapt the proof of the KRW Theorem [1] for our needs. Namely, let B be the set from Prop. 1 and r, q the points appearing there. To obtain a contradiction suppose that B matches △ and hence matches △ V = △ V either. This would mean by definition that
but △ B (r, q) = 0 since r and q are not causally connected in B, while (△ V ) B is singular at the pair r, q (see [1] for the proof) since both these points belong to V and are null connected in it. Contradiction.
Thus we see that even if a spacetime is globally hyperbolic there are two families of IGHN's for any its point, causally convex (and thus GH) sets {G α } (let us call them "good") and those containing null related points {B β } (we shall call them "bad"). Both families include "arbitrarily small" sets (i. e. for any neighbourhood V one can find both a "good" (G α0 ) and a "bad" (B β0 ) subsets of V . Irrespective of what meaning one assigns to the term "the laws in the small" it seems reasonable to assume that they are the same for B β0 and for G α0 . The more it is so as an observer cannot learn whether a neighbourhood is "good" or "bad" without leaving it. And we have seen that the "good" sets match the commutator function while the "bad" ones do not. It follows that identity of physics in two sets does not imply that they both match the same bidistribution. Correspondingly, the fact that the laws in a small region coincide with any other laws does not imply that it (or any its subset) matches the commutator function on a bigger region. So, the requirement (11) that a point should have a neighbourhood matching a global commutator function is not an expression of the Locality principle, but is rather an extraneous condition. It is also an essentially global condition. Indeed, for any point one always can find a bidistribution matching some IGHN of the point, and so the main idea of (11) is that such a bidistribution should exist globally.
We see thus that indeed the F-locality condition needs emendations, since while leading to possible paradoxes it contains a strong nonjustified requirement.
Modified F-locality
In this Section we provide a further evidence in favour of the idea that existence of time machines is inconsistent not with the Locality principle, but only with its inadequate implementation. Namely, we formulate and discuss a candidate necessary condition alternative to the F-locality condition which, while being also based on the Locality principle, does not forbid any causal structure whatsoever.
Consider an arbitrary spacetime M . Let {G α } be the set of all its globally hyperbolic subsets. We can construct a field algebra (at least on a part of M , see below) by adopting the following modification of the F-locality condition:
The MF-locality condition. For all (f, h) ∈ E G relation (8) should hold with △ M replaced by △ MF defined to be a bidistribution matching each G α .
(In other words, we require that φ(f ) and φ(h) with f and h supported on a common GHN G α should commute as if there we no ambient space M − G α at all.) This condition obviously holds in a GH spacetime, where 7 △ MF = △ M . The MF-locality condition differs from the F-locality condition in that A. Some IGHN are replaced by each GHN and B. A condition is imposed only on the field algebra, but not on the geometry of the background spacetime.
Correspondingly, two important consequences take place:
A. As we discussed in Section 3 the F-locality condition does not uniquely fix the commutator function. Neither does the MF-locality condition. The situation has improved, however, in that now we can fix at least the ultraviolet behavior of the commutator function in the region G ≡ α G α where strong causality holds.
Proposition 3. For any spacetime M with non-empty G, △ MF exists and is unique on E G .
Proof. Consider two GHN's, G i and G k . By (2) their intersection is also a GHN (we can thus denote it G ik ) and points in it are causally (null) related if and only if they are causally related in G i (and thus also in G k ). So (see [2] ),
which means that we can define △ MF by the equation
This guarantees that △ MF is a desired bidistribution matching all G α . On the other hand, any functional matching them must satisfy (15), which proves the uniqueness.
B. As we discussed above the F-locality condition is global in nature. Either △ F does not exist on M and we must exclude the whole M from consideration, or △ F exists and then no region is distinguished in this sense. The situation differs greatly if we postulate the MF-locality condition instead. On the one hand any spacetime is allowed now (since △ MF always exists (see Prop. 3); there are no "non-MF-compatible spaces"), and on the other hand different parts of a spacetime now have different status. Each point p ∈ G has a neighbourhood U p such that △ MF (f, h) is determined by the MF-locality condition at least for f, h ∈ D Up . This means that we can develop the theory as we mentioned in the beginning of Section 3 and find T µν (p) eventually. But this cannot be done for points in (M − G), where no field algebra is fixed. So, the surface ∂G separates the area of the present version of semiclassical gravity from terra incognita 8 . The role of ∂G is especially important in the time machine theory since it is ∂G where the divergence of the stress-energy is expected by many authors. So, it should be stressed that physically there is nothing particular in points of ∂G (including the "base points", see [1] ). In the perfect analogy with coordinate singularities in general relativity, ∂G does not correspond to any physical entity, and the fact that we cannot find the energy density in a point of ∂G means not that it is singular or ill-defined here, but simply that we do not know how to do this.
Remark. The MF-locality condition was proposed in this paper only to clarify the relation between causality violations and the Locality principle. However, the uniqueness proved above and the simplicity of the underlying physical assumption suggest that perhaps it deserves a more serious consideration as a possible basis for constructing semiclassical gravity in non-globally hyperbolic spacetimes. Then it would be interesting to find out whether the theory proposed by Yurtsever [13] (which does not, at least explicitly, appeal to any locality principle) is consistent with it.
